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Abstract
Recent research suggests  that trade costs  have a strong  variations in  prices yields estimates  that are superior to
influence on  the pattern of specialization  and trade, but  the ones obtained from  country-specific  measures of
there is limited empirical  research  on the determinants of  communication  infrastructure used in previous studies.
trade costs.  The existing literature identifies  a range of  The authors find that international  variations  in
barriers that separate  nations, but then typically focuses  communication  costs indeed have  a significant influence
only on transport  costs.  Although communication  costs  on  bilateral trade flows-both at the aggregate level and
figure prominently  in intuitive explanations  and casual  for most individual sectors disaggregated  according to
observations,  they have played little  role in the formal  the 2-digit SITC classification.
analysis of trade  costs. Fink, Mattoo,  and Neagu seek to  Since  information  and communication  needs are  likely
examine  whether this neglect  matters,  and whether the  to be  much greater for differentiated  goods, the authors
inclusion of the magnitude  and variation  of  test whether trade  in these  products is more sensitive to
communication  costs across partner countries can  add  variations  in the costs of communication.  Using the
value to  existing explanations  of the pattern of trade.  Rauch classification  of product heterogeneity,  the
The authors develop  a simple multi-sector model of  estimates  suggest that the impact of communication  costs
"impeded"  trade that generates  testable hypotheses  in  a  on trade in  differentiated products is as much  as one-
gravity-type  estimation  framework.  The main proxies  for  third larger than on trade in homogenous products.
bilateral  communication  costs are the per-minute  Finally,  the authors verify, to the extent possible,  that the
country-to-country  calling prices charged in  the  significance  of communication costs  is not driven by
importing and exporting countries.  The use of bilateral  their endogeneity or by omitted variables.
This  paper-a product  of Trade,  Development  Research  Group-is  part  of a larger  effort  in  the group  to  assess the
implications  of liberalizing trade in  services.  Copies of the paper are available  free  from the World Bank,  1818 H Street
NW,  Washington, DC 20433.  Please  contact Paulina  Flewitt,  room MC3-333,  telephone  202-473-2724,  fax 202-522-
1159,  email  address pflewitt@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers are  also  posted  on the  Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  cfink@worldbank.org,  amattoo@worldbank.org,  or
ineagu@worldbank.org.  November  2002. (38  pages)
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Economists have long recognized the importance of communication costs in international trade
(Harris,  1995).  Discussions of the causes of growth in world trade in the last quarter of the 20 "
century frequently  cite technological  progress in telecommunications  and associated declines in
communication costs as an important contributor.  In particular, it has been argued that the
emergence of international production networks has been driven by improved communication
links that facilitated the coordination of geographically dispersed production processes (see, for
example, Krugman,  1995, and Venables,  2002).
Yet we have virtually no empirical insight on how much communication costs matter for trade
and how important they are relative to other components of trading costs.  Firm-based surveys
frequently list the costs and quality of telecommunications  as an important factor in trade and
investment decisions.  For example, Spinanger  (2001) reports evidence from a survey of 14
major textiles and clothing producers in Hongkong (with activities throughout Asia and around
the world), which identifies the quality of telecom infrastructure  as a key factor in decisions  on
export-oriented foreign direct investment-more important than policies affecting trade and
investment, labor costs, and education and training of workers.  Limao and Venables (1999)
construct an index of infrastructure density-including  availability of telecommunications-and
find that it is a significant determinant of bilateral trade costs.  Similarly, Freund and Weinhold
(2000) analyze the effect of Internet diffusion-measured  by a country's number of web hosts-
on trade and find an increasing and significant impact from 1997 to  1999.  While these studies
provide interesting insights regarding the relevance of communication infrastructure,  they do not
offer evidence on how international communication costs affect export and import patterns.
This study is a first attempt to directly quantify the effect of communication costs on bilateral
trade, both in the aggregate and across different product categories.  By employing country-to-
country calling prices, the econometric  investigation relies on bilateral variations in
communication costs between trading partners.  This approach is likely to yield superior
estimates compared to the ones obtained from country-specific measures of communication
infrastructure.
3The paper is organized as follows. We first briefly discuss how communication costs might
influence trade (Section I).  We then introduce communication costs into a gravity-type model
that will form the basis of our empirical investigation (Section II).  After describing the data used
in this study (Section III), we present the structural estimation results and test the validity of our
findings with alternative model specifications (Section IV).  Some concluding remarks are
offered at the end (Section V).
I.  Communication costs,  trade costs and trade
Recent research suggests that trade costs have a strong influence on the pattern of specialization
and trade.  The insights of economic geography models depend critically on the size of trade
costs (Krugman,  1991).  Trade costs have also been seen as influencing the choice between trade
and investment (Markusen and Venables,  2000, Brainard,  1998).  More recently,  Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000) have argued that the introduction of trade costs helps explain not just the "home
market bias" but a variety of puzzles in the field of international macroeconomics.
In view of this growing prominence, it is surprising that there is limited empirical research on the
determinants  of trade costs.  The existing literature identifies a range of barriers that separate
nations-distance,  time, information, etc.-but then typically focuses only on transport costs.'
Although communication costs figure prominently in intuitive explanations and casual
observations,  they have played little role in the formal analysis of trade costs.  This paper seeks
to examine whether this neglect matters, and whether the inclusion of the magnitude and
variation of communication  costs across partner countries can add value to existing explanations
of the pattern of trade.  The explicit inclusion of communication costs could also shed some light
on how far proxies for trade costs such as distance represent the cost of moving goods rather than
the cost of moving information.
Our study focuses on both aggregate bilateral trade and trade in different categories  of products.
Rauch (1999)  has persuasively argued that the heterogeneity of manufactures along the
dimensions of both characteristics  and quality limits the scope for prices to convey all the
lHummels (1999) has undertaken pioneering work in this area.
4necessary information.  Therefore, there is little scope for international  commodity arbitrage
either through organized exchanges or "globally scanning"  traders.  Instead, connections
between buyers and sellers are made through a search process.  In facilitating this process, Rauch
emphasizes the importance of proximity and preexisting ties that result in trading networks rather
than markets.  We do not doubt that such networks play an important role, but it would seem that
the costs and quality of communication links are also an important determinant of the ease with
which information is transmitted.  Since the information and communication needs are much
greater for differentiated  goods, trade in these products  is likely to be more sensitive to variations
in the costs of communication (Harris,  1995).
Modeling the role of communication costs is not, however, straightforward.  For example,
whether conmnunication costs are seen to affect the fixed or variable costs of trade depends on
the role that communication plays in the transaction.  If communication is primarily relevant in
facilitating search for trading partners, then its costs could be seen as affecting the fixed or sunk
costs of trading - which is the view Freund and Weinhold (2000) take of the impact of the
Internet and Harris (1995)  of communication  networks.2 Communication between the supplier
and consumer is, however, also necessary for other reasons, e.g. transmission of product
specifications  and timing of production processes.  In many cases, the consumer and producer
often need to interact in order to jointly produce a customized product that has the desired
characteristics.  The extent of such interaction evidently depends on the nature of the product,
and could affect both the fixed and variable costs of trade.
We assume, nevertheless, that communication  costs affect trade primarily by influencing
variable trade costs between two nations.  This assumption allows us to draw on the large
literature that links trade costs to trade performance.  Specifically,  we can develop a simple
multi-sector model of "impeded" trade that generates testable hypotheses in a gravity type
estimation framework.  The gravity equation is widely regarded as a successful device to
empirically model international trade and is well-founded in economic theory.3 In contrast, the
2 Such pre-sale activities as price-negotiations,  etc. can also be assumed to affect the fixed costs.
3  Various  studies have shown that the gravity equation can be derived from a variety of  trade models that can result
in countries'  perfectly specializing in a particular  good.  These models include the simple Ricardian and Heckscher-
Ohlin trade theories as well as the newer theories with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition.
5literature on search costs and buyer/seller matching does not offer tractable models that easily
lend themselves to empirical application.
It is not obvious how fixed costs could be incorporated into the gravity framework.  While
Freund and Weinhold (2000) argue that the Internet reduces sunk costs of trading, they
eventually estimate an equation that is little different from the standard gravity model.  Evans
(2000) does amend the standard model to incorporate fixed trading costs that differ across
producers.  The implication is that some producers would not recover the fixed cost of exporting
and so not all output is available to be exported.  Empirically, this implies using an appropriately
scaled down level of aggregate output in the gravity equation.  Failure to make this adjustment
implies that the variable trade cost term is (dis)credited with the trade impeding impact of fixed
trade costs.  This finding in fact supports the approach taken here, because  our objective  is to
measure the aggregate impact of telecommunications  costs rather than to identify the precise
channel through which they act.
II.  Introducing communication  costs into a gravity type model of bilateral trade
The.purpose of this section is to develop an empirical model that will allow us to empirically
explore how cross-country variations in communication costs affect bilateral trade.  We consider
a representative  consumer in the importing countryj who maximizes the following utility
function defined on the production of all countries:
u' =J7J  n  ,  E  k  X  (1)
where  Cyk  is countryj's consumption of sector k's good produced by country i, Sk  the elasticity
of substitution between any pair of countries'  products in sector k, and 
13,k  is a weight parameter.
Preferences are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas  over sectors and CES within sectors, whereby  P,k
is countryj's (constant) share of expenditure  devoted to sector k.  Consumers inj derive their
See, for exanple, Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Bergstrand (1985 and 1989) and Deardorff
(1998).
6income,  Y,, from producing domestic products  xJk  at prices  Pik.  They face trade cost inclusive
prices of consumption goods  t,Jkpik , where the trade cost factor  t,ik  is assumed to be equal to one
for the domestically produced good and greater than one for foreign produced goods.
Constrained maximization of (1) leads to optimal consumption levels
1  _______k  ___
Cyk  - Pjk  (2)
where pk  is an index of trade cost inclusive prices
ll(0-ak)
Pik  SWl  ,k  P,k  (3)
Multiplying  (2) by the trade cost inclusive price  t  p,k  yields the value of exports from country i
toj in sector k,  Tk:
Tk  Pjkyjfi,kk  k  (4)
We assume that the trade cost factor  tyk  is a function of countryj's ad-valorem tariff as applied
to imports fromj in sector k,  taryk, the geographic distance (as a proxy inter alia for transport
costs) between countries i and],  D,,, the costs of communication between the two trading
partners,  C,,, and the usual set of variables capturing other ties between the exporting and
importing countries (adjacency and common language),  E  . We choose the following Cobb-
Douglas functional form for the trade cost function:4
4 Hummels  (1999) has pointed out the-counterintuitive  implications of a multiplicative trade cost function: the
impact of a percentage  change in one trade cost variable depends  on the level of the other(s).  He proposes  a trade
cost function in which the individual components enter additively.  This functional  form has the additional
advantage that the estimation of the resulting non-linear gravity equation can separately  identify the substitution
elasticity and the trade cost parameters.  We tried to estimate a similar model using a linear trade cost function
7tjk  = ak (1 + tark)D,j  C,,  Eyk  (5)
Since the import tariff variable is a direct measure of trade costs, the definition of the trade cost
factor implies a proportional relationship between tk  and (1  + tarOk).  With this assumption, (4)
can be transformed to:
I-erk
TIJ= P/kYfI6 k  Pk  a  I7k (1 + taryk  ,  (6)
The variables on the right hand side are a mix of exogenous and endogenous variables.  To fully
estimate the model, one would need to specify supply conditions.  This would complicate the
analysis significantly, as exogenous determinants of trade (technology,  factor endowments)
interact with endogenous  location effects (firms locate production close to final demand, in order
to minimize on trade costs).  However, in this study we are primarily interested in estimating the
effect of communication  costs on trade costs and trade substitution.  We can therefore proceed by
employing importer and exporter specific dummy variables  that account for the country specific
exogenous and endogenous variables,  and rely entirely on the bilateral  variation in the trade cost
variables to estimate their impact on trade (Hummels,  1999).5  The advantage of this approach is
that our empirical model embeds alternative  supply determinants of trade.  The resulting gravity
type equation for bilateral trade between i andj in sector k can be expressed  as:
hn Tk  -A,k  + B,  + (1- -k ) ln(l + taryk ) +k  lnD4 +Xck  lnC, +  Ek  lnE,  +e k  (7)
where  A,k  is a set of exporter fixed effects,  B,k  is set of importer fixed effects,  ek is a normally
distributed error term,  OD -Sk(l-ok)  AX  -Yk=(-kk),and  E  - 2k(l-ok)-
Obviously, the better substitutes countries'  goods are for one another, i.e. the higher the value of
kIk,  the greater is the extent to which bilateral trade between the two countries is impeded by
incorporating communication  costs.  However,  we were not able to obtain non-linear  least squares estimates for our
estimation  sample.
5  Hallack (2001)  and Reddings and Venables (2001) use a similar approach in their econometric  models of bilateral
trade.
8trade costs.  Thus, while being potentially small compared to the value of trade, international
variations in trade costs can exhibit a strong influence on global trade patterns.6 The estimation
of XD,  c  C,  and  Ek does not permit the direct identification of the trade cost elasticities  6k ,  Yk
and 
2k.  However, the coefficient on the tariff variable yields an estimate of the substitution
elasticity, which permits indirect imputation of the trade cost elasticities and, in particular, allows
comparison of these elasticities across sectors.
A neat feature of our estimation equation (7) is that the inclusion of exporter and importer fixed
effects can correct for the omission of  variables that are country specific (e.g., non-tariff
barriers, differences  in inland transportation costs, availability of export finance).  In fact, it
could be argued that equation (7), while derived from a specific model, has general application:
any model explaining bilateral  trade could be expected to result in an exporter specific effect, an
importer specific effect, and factors determining trade costs between two trading partners.  At the
same time, it is important to emphasize that we only measure the effect of trade costs on trade
substitution.  We do not capture the possibility that a country with overall high costs of
communication or transport may in total trade less compared to a country where the overall level
of these costs is lower.
III.  Data sources
We collected cross-sectional  data on the dependent and exogenous variables  for the year  1999.
Bilateral trade flows and import tariffs are from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade
Solutions (WITS) database.  We work with import data, which are reported on a cost-insurance-
freight (cif) basis and therefore include international  freight and insurance charges.  Information
on applied bilateral import tariffs accounts for preferential trading arrangements.7 We
constructed our tariff variable as the weighted average bilateral imported tariff over all 4-digit
SITC product groups belonging to the more aggregate product group used in the estimation.
6  This argument is at the core of the study by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001).
7For a number of  countries, tariff data was unavailable  for the year  1999.  In these instances, we used the year
closest to the estirnation  period.  In a few cases,  we 'extrapolated'  missing bilateral tariffs by taking the average  of
an importer's bilateral tariff over a range of source countries.
9Variation in the importer's tariff across export sources can therefore be due to either trade
preferences or a non-uniform tariff structure combined with a varying composition of bilateral
trade.  The latter can be interpreted as a reflection of the 'Armington assumption'  employed in
our structural  model (i.e., that imports from different sources are imperfect substitutes for one
another).
The distance measure refers to the straight-line distance between nations'  capitals and was taken
from the City Distance Calculator provided by VulcanSoft.8 As variables capturing other ties
between exporters and importers, we used the standard set of dummy variables  for sharing a
common border and a common language  (English, Spanish,  French, Portuguese, and Arabic).
We assembled two proxies to capture the communication-related  effect of trade costs, each with
certain pros and cons.  Our first proxy is the per-minute  bilateral calling prices charged in the
importing and exporting countries,  as reported in the ITU's Direction of Traffic Statistics.
Current exchange rates from the IMF International Financial  Statistics were used to convert the
prices into U.S. dollar values.  For each country only the calling prices of the 20 most popular
destinations were listed in the ITU database, which limits the number of observations available
for estimation.  Because the simultaneous availability of bilateral price data for the importing
and exporting countries is limited, we tested these two proxies in separate regressions.9
Our second proxy is the product of each country's calling price to the United States.  Since the
United States is always among the top 20 destinations, use of this proxy allowed us to
substantially increase the size of the sample.  However, the proxy has two drawbacks.  First,
calling prices to the United States may not be representative of a country's overall tariff
structure.  Secondly, in contrast to the two bilateral calling price variables, the variation in one
country's calling prices across trading partners is not directly measured,  but constructed by
multiplying two country-specific variables.  The latter approach introduces a bias if the telecom
proxy employed is correlated with other country-specific variables that influence bilateral trade
and if those variables enter the regression equation in a multiplicative functional form.
8 The software can be freely downloaded at www.vulcansoft.com.
9 The sample that includes calling prices for both exporting  and importing country has less than 500 observations.
Tentative  OLS regressions using this small sample led to similar findings as the ones presented in this study
10Table  1 presents  summary statistics on the dependent and independent variables  used-in the
empirical analysis.  It is interesting to note the large variation in the costs of international
communication.  Thus, the 1999 calling price to the United States ranged from 9 cents per
minute for the Netherlands  to $8.91  per minute for Syria.  Most dramatically, bilateral calling
prices ranged from less than one-tenth of one cent per minute (for a call from Vietnam to several
neighboring countries) to $9.80 per minute (for a call from Syria to Japan).
Tables 2 presents partial correlations among the dependent  and independent variables (in natural
logs).  Tariffs, distance and communication costs are all negatively correlated with bilateral
trade.  The distance term itself is weakly correlated with the "constructed" telecom proxy
(product of U.S. calling prices), but shows a stronger correlation with the bilateral  calling prices.
The correlation between the two bilateral calling prices is weak and not statistically significant.
This finding is surprising, as operators at both-ends of a bilateral route face the same accounting
rate. 10 It suggests that differences in factor costs, market structures, elasticities of demand and
pricing regulations play an important role in determining international tariffs.  For the purpose of
this study, the weak correlation between the two bilateral calling prices is actually advantageous,
as we can separately assess the role of communication costs incurred by the exporting  and
importing country.
IV.  Structural estimation results
Aggregate tradeflows
We start by estimating a single-sector version of equation (7), using aggregate bilateral trade in
1999 as the dependent variable and ordinary least squares estimation technique (Table 3).  The
coefficient  on the tariff variable is negative and statistically significant.  The implied substitution
elasticity ranges from -3.3 to -3.8.  The coefficients on distance and each of the three telecom
proxies are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The border and language
'° The accounting rate is the wholesale  price negotiated between national telecommunications  operators for
terminating international calls.  It is symmetric  in the sense that a carrier from country A faces the same accounting
rate for settling traffic  in country B as the carrier from country B for settling traffic in country A.  See, for example,
Yun et al (1997) and Galbi (1 998) for further explanation.dummy variables either show a significant positive coefficient or are not statistically different
from zero (except on coefficient on Arabic language which shows a significant negative
coefficient).  The explanatory  power of the model  is quite high, with R-squares ranging from
0.809 to 0.927.1'
These estimations were subject to several robustness tests, which are described in the Annex.
We tested a model specification that is closer to the functional constraints imposed by the CES
preferences.  We also addressed potential biases stemming from non-random selection of
samples.  These additional estimations did not lead to fundamentally different results, but the
coefficients on the "pure bilateral" telecommunications  price variables were more stable than the
"constructed  bilateral" telecommunications  proxy.  In view of these findings and their superior
econometric properties, we conclude that the two "pure bilateral" price variables are better
measures of the effect of communication  costs on bilateral trade.
Disaggregated  trade  flows
Our second set of estimates are sectoral gravity equations using trade flows disaggregated
according to the 2-digit SITC classification. 1 2 We only present estimation results with regard to
the two bilateral calling price variables, distance and the tariff variable (in Table 4 for the
bilateral calling price of the exporting country and in Table 5 for the bilateral calling price of the
importing country). 1 3 The sectors are sorted by descending value of the ratio of the coefficient
on the bilateral calling price to the coefficient on the tariff variable-the imputed trade cost
elasticity with respect to communications  costs.  Virtually all estimated coefficients on distance
and calling prices have the expected negative sign and the great majority of the coefficients  are
"1  Note that the distance coefficient is smaller in the estimations with the two bilateral calling price variables,  for
which sample sizes are substantially smaller.  One explanation could be that the 'pure bilateral' proxies exert a
stronger offsetting effect on the distance coefficient than the product of calling prices to the U.S.  Indeed,  running
the former regression without any telecom proxy yields a distance coefficient that is about 0.2 higher, which equals
approximately the partial correlation  between distance and bilateral calling prices (Table 2a).  While the distance
coefficient  with a hypothetical 0.2 increase is still smaller than the large sample estimates,  it is  consistent with the
gravity literature, which typically reports distance coefficients  around or somewhat above unity (see,  for example,
Rose (2000) or Limao and Venables (1999)).
12  We excluded two sectors from the estimation ("electric current"  and "gas"), because the number of observations
in the concerned 2-digit SITC group was too small to permit meaningful estimations.
13  We also estimated sectoral gravity equations using the product of U.S. calling prices.  While the estimated
coefficients mostly showed the expected signs, the results did not reveal any interesting patterns across  sectors.  In
view of the inferior econometric properties of this variable, we decided to not present these results here.
12statistically significant.  The coefficients on the tariff variable are also mostly negative and
statistically significant.' 4
The sorting of sectors by the imputed trade cost elasticity suggests that communication costs are
relatively more important in sectors that exhibit a greater extent of product differentiation or low
international transport costs.  Examples of these sectors include chemical materials,
pharmaceutical  products, specialized machinery.  Could it be that communication needs in the
case of differentiated products are greater and that trade in these products is therefore more
sensitive to variations in the costs of communication?
To explore this question more formally, we employed the product classification developed by
Rauch (1999),  who divides internationally traded commodities into three groups.  The first group
includes all goods that are traded on organized exchanges and consist of homogenous
commodities such as cement, steel or tobacco.  The second group includes goods that are not
traded on organized exchanges but nevertheless possess reference prices.  This category of goods
still largely consists of homogenous products, such as certain chemicals for which prices are
listed in specialized trade publications.  The third product group includes all other commodities
and thus encompasses all differentiated goods for which significant  buyer-seller interaction is
necessary.
We estimated sectoral gravity equations using trade flows classified according to Rauch's three
product groups, again confining our estimates to the two bilateral calling price proxies (Table 6).
The results reveal several  interesting patterns.  First, the estimated coefficient  on the tariff
variable is not statistically different from zero in the case of differentiated products,  suggesting a
low elasticity of substitution (close to unity).  However,  it is negative and statistically significant
in the case of reference priced products (only when using the importer's calling price) and
negative, statistically significant and greater in absolute size in the case of products traded over
organized exchanges.  Our result is consistent with the expectation  that the elasticity of
14 The average value of the tariff variable for the exporter calling price sample is, in fact, substantially  larger than the
corresponding  value in the comparable  one-sector gravity  estimation presented in Table 3. This result is consistent
with findings in the literature that substitution elasticities are larger at the sectoral level than at the aggregate level
(Hummels,  1999 and Gallaway et al, 2000).  However, this 'disaggregation  effect'  is not found in the importer
calling price sample.
13substitution is larger for more homogenous products, leading to a greater sensitivity of bilateral
trade to changes in trade costs.
Second, the estimated distance coefficients for differentiated products are smaller in absolute
value than the coefficients for reference priced products, and the coefficients on the latter are
again smaller than the ones for products traded over organized exchanges.  In other words, in line
with our structural model, the rising substitution elasticity leads to a greater sensitivity of
bilateral trade to distance.  This result is in contrast to Rauch (1999) who finds the coefficient  on
distance to be larger in absolute value for differentiated products.  He argues that the trade-
inhibiting effect of distance is likely to be larger in the case of differentiated products, for which
greater buyer-seller interaction is necessary.  5
Third, the estimated coefficient on the exporter's  calling price is not statistically different from
zero for products traded over organized exchanges,  suggesting that communication cost
conditions in the exporting country are of little importance for pure homogenous commodities.
Fourth, the impact of the importer's calling price on trade in differentiated products is
substantially larger than on trade in reference priced products and trade in homogenous products.
In fact, we observe an overall  'downward trend' in the coefficient on the telecom proxies as we
move from differentiated to homogenous products.  Since our estimated substitution elasticity
shows a reverse  'upward trend,' the implied elasticity of trade costs with respect to the
communication cost proxy is substantially larger for differentiated products than for homogenous
products.  These results confirm our initial observations based on the sectoral estimations
described above.  In the Annex, we corrected for a possible bias in our estimates for Rauch's
product groups due to a non-random  selection of samples, but the results did not change.
15 To test whether this result is due to the inclusion of the communication  cost proxy, we excluded
telecommunications  costs from our model and reran the regressions  in two scenarios. The first, using the entire
dataset available in the absence of  telecom bilateral prices, reproduced the Rauch finding,  i.e. distance seemed to
matter more for differentiated  goods. In the second, using only data for which bilateral telecom prices  were
available,  the distance coefficient preserved the pattern observed in our initial regressions including the telecom
variables,  except that its overall magnitude  was slightly larger.  These results suggest that the Rauch result is not
robust to changes in the sample.
14The sectoral estimates reveal that the importer's calling price consistently has a larger effect than
the exporter's calling price.16 Two explanations  are possible.  One is that the exporter's
expenditure  on international telecommunications  is likely to be included in observed trade
values, whereas the importer's expenditure  may not be.  In the derivation of the econometric
model, we implicitly assumed that trade values are inclusive of all trade costs.  A more general
specification would allow for a share of trade costs to be excluded in recorded trade values.  It is
easy to verify that in this case the estimated coefficient on the communication cost proxy can be
expressed as:
4c  -rk  (ak  Ck ) v
where  ak  (0  < ak  < 1) is the (geometric) share of communication costs implicitly included in
trade values.  Hence,  if a larger share of communication costs is part of observed trade values (as
one would expect in the case of the exporter's calling price), the trade-inhibiting  effect of
telecommunications  is dampened.
The other more speculative explanation is that communication costs affect the fixed costs of
trading, and that the relative impact on exporters and importers  differs across the type of
products.  Note that if the impact were on the variable costs alone, then who actually pays the
cost would be irrelevant because the incidence of those costs would be ind&pendently given by
the elasticities of demand  and supply.  With fixed costs of trade, it does matter who actually
pays-even though some costs may be passed through prices.  Our findings suggest, for
example, that suppliers play a virtually passive communication role where homogeneous goods
are concerned,  and that importers bear a larger burden of communication in the case of
differentiated products.
Alternative specifications
Our results accord with intuition, but we must ensure that the revealed importance of
telecommunications  is not attributable to any specification  errors in our structural model.  Such
16 The larger relative impact of the importer calling price was found for the sectoral estimates in Tables 4 and 5, as
well as for the Rauch product group estimates in Table 6. This difference is also evident when controlling for
possible selection biases in the two samples (see Annex Table A3).
15errors could be due to omitted variables and endogeneity.  In this sub-section,  we address each of
these problems to the extent feasible.
First of all, we could have excluded determinants of trade costs that are correlated with
communications  costs.  Perhaps the most important such omission is the cost of transportation,
which is only imperfectly captured by bilateral distance.  Unfortunately, no comprehensive data
source exists for bilateral freight charges.  Based on national customs data, Hummels (1999) has
assembled a dataset that includes commodity-specific  ad-valorem transport cost figures for six
importing countries  (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, United States, and Uruguay).  In
spite of the small size of the sample, we tested our model for this set of importing countries  for
the year 1994. 17
We introduce the ad-valorem freight variable into the gravity equation (7), by constructing a new
variable of directly measured trade costs,  (1 + tar,k + fuk ),  which leads to a better estimate of the
substitution elasticity  a.  Since we only have relatively few observations on the bilateral calling
price variables, we run this regression at the 2-digit SITC level. 1 8 This is feasible because our
tariff and transport cost variable are available at that level of disaggregation.  The drawback with
this procedure is that we implicitly assume that all the independent variables affect each of the 2-
digit SITC product groups in an identical way.'9
Table 7 presents our estimation results.  The tariff plus transport cost variable performs
according to expectations:  it has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level.  The implied elasticity of substitution ranges between -5.3 and -6,  which in line with the
previous literature (see Hummels,  1999), but larger than in the 'world gravity'  model.  The
17 We thank David Hummels for sharing the transport cost data.  The dataset actually includes Paraguay as a seventh
importing country,  but we had to exclude Paraguay due to the unavailability  of  data on our telecom proxies.  We
complemented the ITU information with more comprehensive data on the  1994 international calling tariffs for the
United States, Brazil and Uruguay.  These data were provided to us by national regulators and telecom operators.
We did not test the  'constructed telecom proxy' of calling prices to the United States, as this variable cannot, by
definition, be constructed for the United States and would have caused a substantial reduction in the number of
observations.
18  The regression at the aggregate level could only be run with less than 300 observations and did not produce
statistically  significant coefficients on the communication cost proxies.
19 Inclusion of product group specific fixed effect could, in principle, account for sectoral heterogeneities, but this
approach would take us away from our structural estimation equation (7).
16coefficients on the two telecom variables take the expected negative value, are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level (exporter's calling price) and 5 percent level (importer's calling
price) and are comparable in magnitude to our earlier results.20
The estimated coefficient on distance takes a similar negative value as in Table 3 and is always
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  This result offers an insight to the so-called
'distance puzzle' in explanations of bilateral trade (Loungani et al., 2002): even after explicitly
controlling for transport and communications costs, distance has a strong impeding effect on
bilateral trade.  In other words, distance seems to capture trade-inhibiting factors other than
concurrent  transport and communication costs.21
A second problem could be that telecommunications  costs are endogenous to bilateral trade.  For
example,  international calling prices may themselves be influenced  by bilateral trade flows.  One
possibility is that stronger commercial ties and greater telecommunications  traffic between two
nations may allow operators to reap economies of scale and lower operating costs.  Conversely,
it could be that country pairs with more trade and thus greater communications needs exhibit
lower demand elasticities and this may lead international operators-many of which are still
monopolies-to raise prices substantially  above marginal costs.
It is customary to address endogeneity  problems by using the instrumental variable  approach in a
two stages least squares estimation.  In our case,  it is not obvious what the appropriate
instruments  would be, especially since we wish to capture bilateral variations  in our telecom
variables, and the specific nature of the endogeneity  problem is not clear.  Nevertheless,  we
constructed three different instruments:  the product of the two trading partners'  bilateral
accounting rate with the United States;  a dummy variable that is one if there was competition for
20 We also performed  Rauch product group estimates, using the transport-cost inclusive dataset.  Again, to generate
more variation in the data, we performed  these regressions  at the 4-digit SITC level, which  is the level on which the
Rauch classification  is based.  While the importer's  calling price is only statistically significant  in the case of
differentiated goods, the pattern of coefficients emerging for the exporter's calling price suggests that
communications  costs are most important  for reference-priced  goods, followed by homogeneous  and differentiated
products.  One important caveat with regard to these results is that they are based on markedly different sample
sizes, and so there are doubts about their comparability.
21  The border and language  dummies also perform according to prior expectations,  although the dummies for
Spanish and Portuguese language  are not statistically different from zero.  R-squares  are relatively  low, ranging
between 0.337 and 0.386.  This is due to the fact that estimations are performed on disaggregate trade flows w'hich
show greater noise than aggregate  trade flows or trade flows belonging to the same product group.
17international services on both ends of the bilateral  route;  and the product of a country specific
proxy capturing the extent to which incumbent public telecommunications  operators were
privatized.22 The three variables performed according to expectations in the first stage
estimation (positive  sign for the accounting rate, negative sign for the competition and
privatization proxies), although the privatization variable was not always statistically significant.
The second stage estimation results for the aggregate 'world gravity model' are presented in
Table 8.  The coefficient on the instrumented calling prices is significantly negative and much
larger than the estimate in the earlier OLS regression (Table 3), taking a value of -2.806 in the
case of the importer's .calling price.23
These results underline a concern that is in fact also raised by our earlier estimates:  the
unexpectedly  large impact of telecommunication costs-and trade costs more generally-on
trade.  Taken at their face value, our estimates suggest, for example, that a halving of the
importer's calling price leads to a 42.5 percent increase in aggregate bilateral trade.  These are
large values even if bilateral communication  costs are seen as proxies for the quality and ease of
communication between two nations.  The large impact of the trade cost proxies is not new to
our study or to communications  costs per se, however.  Take the distance coefficient,  which is in
line with estimates found in the literature.  A doubling of the exporter-importer  distance reduces
bilateral trade by up to 50 percent, which can hardly be justified in pure transport cost terms.24
The existing literature  offers at least two explanations.  One is that trade costs affect bilateral
trade through channels other than the 'simple' trade substitution mechanism underlying the
gravity equation.  Hummels (1999) suggests that the trade cost proxies may pick up endogenous
supply responses by firms choosing production locations to minimize trade costs.  If endogenous
22 Specifically,  the latter variable is  defined as one plus the equity share in  the incumbent operator that was in  private
hands.  The data on competition in  intemational telecommunications  and the extent of privatization was obtained
from the ITU-World Bank Telecommunications  Policy Database.
23  We also performed instrumental  variable regressions for the three 'Rauch'  product groups.  The coefficients on
the calling price variables are much larger in absolute value than those obtained from the aggregate regression,
although the exporter calling price is not always statistically significant.
24 Hummels (1999) provides  some estimates of the elasticity of ad-valorem transport costs with respect to distance,
ranging between 0.2 and 0.4 depending  on the transport mode.  Given that transport, on average, does not make up
more than  10 percent of the value of traded goods, this implies an elasticity of the transport cost factor-one plus the
ad-valorem transport cost-with respect to distance of 0.02 to 0.04, implying a much smaller price premium.  This
point was originally noted by Grossman  (1998).
18supply effects simply lead to a reallocation of resources between individual  sectors k, then they
are captured in our estimation equation.25 However,  each individual sector k still lumps together
fairly heterogeneous  sub-groups, and so our trade cost proxies may in fact pick up endogenous
location effects  operating at a more disaggregate  level.26
A second possibility is that our trade cost proxies measure not only trade costs but also
differences  in consumer preferences over products from different locations.  The utility function
in equation (1) assumes that consumers in all importing countriesj put equal preference weights,
fi,k, on products from the same sources i. A more general specification would allow these
weights to differ across exporting countries.  It is easy show that these bilateral weights,  8j,k,  are
then not absorbed by the country-specific fixed effects.  If these bilateral  weights are correlated
with the proxies we took as measuring trade costs alone, then it is possible that the estimated
coefficients in the gravity equation capture the effect of both bilateral trade costs and bilateral
preferences  (see Balistrery and Hillberry, 2001).  However, while it is plausible that distance and
language proxies are related to bilateral preferences,  such a relationship is less obvious in the
case of telecommunication costs.
V.  Conclusion
The link between communication costs and the pattern of trade has been based previously more
on intuition than evidence  We tested this relationship by incorporating alternative measures of
communication  costs in a standard model of bilateral trade.  International variations in
communication  costs were shown to have a significant influence on trade patterns.  Furthermore,
estimates using disaggregated trade data revealed that communication costs have a greater
impact on trade in differentiated products than on trade in homogenous  products.
25  Obviously, in  the aggregate,  one-sector version of the gravity equation there is  no room for endogenous supply
responses.
26 Another possibility to the  'simple'  substitution mechanism is  that trade costs have a fixed, as opposed to a
variable character,  as already pointed out above.  It  has been shown that small differences in  partner-specific  fixed
costs-incurred either by the consumer or the producer-can  yield large swings in  trade flows (Evans, 2000).
19The paper should, nevertheless, be seen only as a first step in understanding the role of
communication  in trade, and its broader objective  is to provoke both theoretical and empirical
research in this area.  Several basic questions deserve more detailed  attention.  What precisely is
the nature of communication between importers and exporters?  How does it differ across
product categories, final goods and intermediate, homogeneous and differentiated?  How does it
differ for intra-firm trade relative to inter-firm trade?  What types of costs are incurred, variable
or fixed?  Who bears these costs and when does it matter?  Greater information on these issues,
would make it possible to address grander questions, such as the role of communication in
facilitating the development of international production chains, or more generally, influencing
the pattern of global integration.
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22Table 1: Summary statistics
Number of  Standard
Variable  observations  Mean  deviation  Minimum  Maximum
Bilateral trade  8,302  614,814  4,631,744  0.001  201,000,000
Distance  11,554  7,868  4,351  78  19,920
Weighted average tariff  8,614  0.099  0.115  0.000  3 270
Bilateral calling price  12,769  5.052  2.812  1.000  9.000
Calling price to US  8,588  1.293  1.207  0.092  8.909
Note.  Dataset covers bilateral trade of 107 countries.
Table 2: Partial correlation between variables
Product of
Exporter  Importer  calling
Bilateral  calling  calling  prices to
trade  Distance  price  price  US  Tariff
Bilateral trade  1
Distance  -0.192  1
Exporter calling price  -0.316  0.236  1
Importer calling price  -0.450  0.236  0.128  1
Product of calling prices to  -0.502  0.080  0.273  0.273  1
Us
Tariff  -0.195  0.039  0.036  0.117  0.269  1
Notes  All variables are expressed  in natural logarithms.  Bolded figures are statistically significant at the  I
percent level.
23Table 3:  Gravity model using aggregate trade flows, 1999
Dependent variable:  T,,  (1)  (2)  (3)
Distance  -0.651***  -0.582***  -1.085***
(-9.14)  (-9.93)  (-24.04)
Tariff  -2.342*  -2.693***  -2.801***
(-1.89)  (-2.89)  (-3.47)
Bilateral  calling  price of  exporter  -0.943***
(-5.90)
Bilateral  calling  price of importer  -0.848***
(-5.79)
Product  of  calling  prices to the US  -2.325***
(-23.44)
Common border  Correct  Correct  Correct
Language  dummies
English  Correct  Correct  Correct
Spanish  Insignificant  Insignificant  Correct
Portuguese  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant
French  Insignificant  Correct  Correct
Arabic  Insignificant  Wrong  Correct
Number of observations  1,231  1,116  4,179
F-statistic  385.37***  1463.79***  127.8***
R-square  0.902  0.927  0.809
Notes:  OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors.  t-
statistics in parentheses.  ***  denotes significance at the I percent level;  ** denotes  significance at the 5
percent level;  * denotes significance  at the  10 percent level.  'Correct'  indicates a dummy variable as the
expected positive sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level;  'insignificant'  indicates a
dummy variable  is not statistically different from zero; and 'wrong'  indicates a dummy variables has a
wrong negative sign and is statistically significant at least at the  10 percent level.
24Table 4:  Sectoral estimates  using the bilateral calling price of the exporting country, 1999
Bilateral
SITC2  calling  Ratio calling
code  Sector  No. of obs  Distance  price  Tariff  price to tariff
22  Oil seeds and oleaginous  fruit  700  -0.655  -1.114  -0.743  1.500
71  Power generating  machinery/ equipment  951  -0.774  -0.724  -0.514  1.409
12  Tobacco and tobacco manufactures  671  -0.556  -0.826  -0.739  1.117
73  Metalworking  machinery  841  -0.618  -0.700  -0.707  0.990
54  Medicinal and pharmaceutical products  884  -0.614  -1.358  -1.490  0.911
62  Rubber manufactures,n.e.s.  928  -0.603  -1.256  -2.093  0.600
56  Fertilizers, manufactured  569  -0.749  -1.491  -2.992  0.498
55  Essential oils & perfume  materials  975  -0.925  -1.071  -3.564  0.301
72  Specialized machinery  1,012  -0.758  -0.761  -3.047  0.250
52  Inorganic chemicals  834  -0.870  -1.061  -4.487  0.236
77  Electrical machinery/apparatus n.e.s.  1,077  -0.888  -0.720  -3.116  0.231
59  Chemical materials and products.  894  -0.904  -0.534  -2.431  0.220
2  Dairy products and birds'  eggs  588  -0.864  -0.923  -4.242  0.218
84  Articles  of apparel/clothing  accessories  1,098  -0.967  -0.644  -2.975  0.217
74  General industrial machinery  1,054  -0.641  -0.897  -5.123  0.175
68  Non-ferrous metals  878  -0.987  -0.965  -5.984  0.161
69  Manufactures  of metal  1,073  -0.746  -0.889  -5.540  0.160
9  Miscel.edible  products and preparations  861  -0.858  -0.840  -5.471  0.154
7  Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices  1,024  -0.646  -0.431  -2.825  0.152
41  Animal oils and fats  458  -0.430  -1.051  -6.961  0.151
51  Organic chemicals  870  -0.513  -0.847  -5.791  0.146
57  Explosives and pyrotechnic products  381  -0.452  -1.093  -7.639  0.143
4  Cereals  and cereal preparations  854  -0.986  -0.653  -4.635  0.141
63  Cork and wood manufactures  1,046  -0.822  -0.931  -7.078  0.132
33  Petroleum,  petroleum products  828  -1.588  -1.296  -10.364  0.125
58  Artif.resins,plastic  materials  878  -0.823  -1.264  -10.377  0.122
85  Footwear  881  -0.741  -0.797  -6.603  0.121
28  Metalliferous  ores and metal scrap  819  -1.148  -0.728  -6.189  0.118
67  Iron and steel  877  -1.028  -0.810  -6.922  0.117
6  Sugar, sugar preparations  and honey  841  -0.939  -0.552  -4.786  0.115
61  Leather and leather manufactures  919  -0.684  -0.828  -7.186  0.115
82  Furniture  and parts thereof  1,023  -0.711  -0.818  -7.265  0.113
21  Hides,skinsandfurskins,raw  601  -0.611  -0.336  -3.144  0.107
5  Vegetables  and fruit  1,067  -0.670  -0.892  -8.761  0.102
66  Non-metallic mineral  manufactures  1,085  -0.615  -0.703  -7.060  0.100
87  Professional  & scientific  instruments  1,018  -0.598  -0.692  -7.194  0.096
53  Dyeing, tanning and coloring materials  840  -0.637  -0.853  -9.117  0.094
1  Meat and meat preparations  661  -1.036  -0.461  -5.031  0.092
64  Paper,  paperboard,  paper-pulp/board  942  -1.082  -1.149  -12.985  0.088
65  Textile yarn, fabrics, made-upart.  1,108  -0.723  -0.832  -9.428  0.088
89  Miscellaneous  manufactured articles, nes  1,170  -0.914  -0.375  -4.353  0.086
75  Office machines/data processing equip.  999  -0.703  -0.707  -8.239  0.086
83  Travel goods and handbags  921  -0.735  -0.414  -4.949  0.084
25Bilateral
SITC2  calling  Ratio calling
code  Sector  No. of obs  Distance  price  Tariff  price to tariff
3  Fish,crustaceans,mollucs,  967  -0.796  -0.430  -5.578  0.077
81  Samtary,  heating and lighting fixtures  873  -0.842  -0.619  -8.154  0.076
0  Live animals chiefly for food  474  -0.885  -0.597  -8.088  0.074
32  Coal,  coke and briquettes  437  -0.768  -0.888  -12.556  0.071
88  Photographic and optical goods, watches  939  -0.506  -0.305  -4.855  0.063
76  Telecom.  and sound recording apparatus  1,023  -0.680  -0.542  -8.958  0.060
42  Fixed vegetable oils and fats  698  -0.369  -0.662  -11.211  0.059
26  Textile fibres  and their wastes  923  -0.743  -0.307  -5.592  0.055
27  Crude fertilizers and crude materials  916  -1.089  -0.331  -11.797  0.028
25  Pulp and waste paper  519  -1.489  -0.180  -19.625  0.009
43  Animal-vegetable  oils-fats  614  -1.002  0.134  -2.981  n/a
23  Crude rubber (incl. synthetic/reclaimed)  616  -0.825  -0.111  1.284  n/a
78  Road vehicles (incl. air cushion vehicles)  996  -0.969  -0.832  2.721  n/a
79  Other transport equipment  801  -0.727  -1.006  3.081  n/a
24  Cork and wood  893  -1.018  -0.418  0.737  n/a
29  Crude animal and vegetable  materials  1,037  -0.620  -0.986  1.327  n/a
II  Beverages  881  -0.614  -0.374  0.327  n/a
8  Feeding  stuff for animals  765  -0.758  -0.953  0.266  n/a
Average:  859  -0.795  -0.749  -5.243  0.098
Notes  OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors.  t-statistics in
parentheses.  *  ** denotes significance at the  I percent level;  ** denotes  significance  at the 5 percent level;  * denotes
significance at the  10 percent level.
26Table 5:  Sectoral estimates using the bilateral calling price of the importing country, 1999
Bilateral
SITC2  calling  Ratio calling
code  Sector  No. of obs  Distance  price  Tariff  price/tariff
11  Beverages  980  -0.509  -1.782  -0.169  10.557
59  Chemical materials and products,  n.e.s.  1,070  -0.814  -1.612  -0  164  9.858
29  Crude animal and vegetable  materials  994  -0.777  -0.741  -0.263  2.822
82  Furniture and parts thereof  1,069  -0.986  -1.020  -0.383  2.664
8  Feeding stuff for animals  882  -0.833  -1.707  -0.726  2.352
51  Organic chemicals  1,031  -0.441  -1.710  -1.018  1.680
41  Animal oils and fats  597  -0.837  -1.296  -1.707  0.759
55  Essential oils & perfume materials  1,074  -0.727  -1.945  -2.797  0.695
62  Rubber manufactures,  n.e.s.  1,073  -0.819  -1.447  -2.096  0.690
23  Crude rubber (incl.  synthetic/reclaimed)  789  -0.828  -1 196  -2.177  0.549
6  Sugar, sugar preparations and honey  973  -1.089  -1.650  -3.035  0.544
9  Miscel.edible  products and preparations  1,038  -0.916  -1.987  -3.683  0.540
67  Iron and steel  1,061  -0.907  -1.588  -2.988  0.532
26  Textile fibres and their wastes  987  -1.110  -0.764  -1.463  0.522
84  Articles  of apparel,  clothing accessories  1,077  -0.911  -1.112  -2.143  0.519
52  Inorganic chemicals  1,032  -0.775  -1.592  -3.165  0.503
7  Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices  990  -1.074  -1.343  -2.851  0.471
68  Non-ferrous metals  1,030  -0.936  -1.827  -4.148  0.441
88  Photographic/  optical goods, watches  1,048  -0.615  -1.761  -4.010  0.439
24  Corkandwood  814  -0.851  -0.925  -2.145  0.431
58  Artif.resins,plastic  materials  1,060  -0.851  -2.099  -5.169  0.406
66  Non-metallic mineral manufactures  1,091  -0.655  -1.274  -3.616  0.352
28  Metalliferous  ores andmetal scrap  788  -0.788  -0.883  -2.541  0.348
65  Textile yarn,fabrics,made-upart.  1,095  -0.843  -1.150  -3.446  0.334
2  Dairyproductsandbirds'eggs  853  -1.075  -1.375  4.151  0.331
61  Leather,  leather manufactures  939  -0.696  -1.212  -3.927  0.309
85  Footwear  981  -0.764  -1.595  -5.186  0.308
27  Crude fertilizers and crude materials  1,012  -1.084  -1.360  4.443  0.306
22  Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit  725  -1.279  -0.667  -2.459  0.271
12  Tobacco  and tobacco manufactures  748  -0.548  -1.045  -4.034  0.259
83  Travel goods and handbags  995  -0.673  -1.046  -4.071  0.257
4  Cereals and cereal preparations  1,020  -I 020  -1.845  -7.210  0.256
3  Fish, crustaceans,  mollucs,  891  -0.874  -1.164  -4.643  0.251
I  Meat and meat preparations  813  -1.399  -1.024  -4.196  0.244
63  Cork and wood manufactures  1,033  -1.007  -0.812  -3.478  0.234
64  Paper, paperboard, paper-pulp/board  1,081  -1.165  -1.521  -6.978  0.218
33  Petroleum and petroleum products  1,022  -1.543  -1.218  -5.686  0.214
81  Sanitary, heating and lighting fixtures  1,023  -0.970  -1.112  -5.584  0.199
75  Office  machines & data process.  equip.  1,061  -1.105  -0.907  4.581  0.198
42  Fixed vegetable oils and fats  876  -1.145  -0.852  -4.334  0.197
79  Other transport equipment  932  -0.870  -0.830  -4.584  0.181
56  Fertilizers  796  -1.260  -0.891  -5.380  0.166
57  Explosives and pyrotechnic products  521  -0.328  -1.056  -6.609  0.160
27Bilateral
SITC2  calling  Ratio calling
code  Sector  No. of  obs  Distance  price  Tariff  price/tariff
5  Vegetables and fruit  1,026  -1.153  -0.587  -3.848  0.153
0  Live animals  chiefly for food  572  -0.966  -0.859  -5.682  0.151
76  Telecom. &sound recording  apparatus  1,070  -0.813  -0.811  -5.512  0.147
21  Hides, skins and furskins  562  -0.554  -0.673  -4.906  0.137
43  Animal-vegetable  oils-fats  790  -1.183  -0.359  -4 195  0.086
32  Coal, coke and briquettes  496  -0.881  -1.103  -25.908  0.043
25  Pulp and waste paper  629  -0.983  -0.771  6.727  n/a
87  Professional & scientific instruments  1,066  -0.556  -1.388  6.035  n/a
73  Metalworking machinery  1,003  -0.755  -1.457  4.368  n/a
72  Specialized machinery  1,083  -0.674  -1.246  3.578  n/a
89  Miscellaneous manufactured  articles  1,108  -0.742  -1.214  1.909  n/a
53  Dyeing, tanning and coloring materials  1,044  -0.814  -1.690  1.999  n/a
69  Manufactures  of metal, n.e.s.  1,101  -0.764  -1.470  1.539  n/a
77  Electrical machinery & appliances  1,096  -0.661  -1.338  0.853  n/a
78  Road vehicles  1,095  -0.864  -1.651  1.024  n/a
74  General  industrial machinery  1,093  -0.773  -0.970  0.535  n/a
54  Medicinal and pharmaceutical products  1,070  -0.379  -1.791  0.356  n/a
71  Power generating  machinery  1,054  -0.543  -1.399  0.187  n/a
Average:  950  -0.865  -1.258  -2.760  0.904
Notes:  OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors.  t-statistics  in
parentheses.  *** denotes significance at the  I percent level;  ** denotes  significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes
significance at the 10 percent level.
28Table 6:  Trade in differentiated versus homogenous goods, 1999
Products traded
Differentiated  Reference  priced  over organized
products  products  exchanges
Dependent
variable:  T, 1 (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Distance  -0.714***  -0.573***  -0.892***  -0.834***  -1.061***  -I.136***
(-9.35)  (-9.11)  (-9.43)  (-9.02)  (-8.67)  (-10.28)
Tariff  0.793  0.063  -0.440  -1.793***  -3.794*  -2.998***
(0.72)  (0.06)  (-0.38)  (-2.41)  (-1.87)  (-3.22)
Bilateral  calling  -0.750***  -0.814***  -0.383
price of  exporter  (-4.71)  (4.08)  (-1.42)
Bilateral  calling  -1.022***  -0.793***  -0.818***
price of importer  (-6.82)  (-3.14)  (-3.54)
Common border  Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct
Language dummies
English  Correct  Correct  Correct  Correct  Insignificant  Insignificant
Spanish  Insignificant  Correct  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant
Portuguese  Correct  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Correct
French  Correct  Correct  Correct  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant
Arabic  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant
Number of  1,224  1,117  1,197  1,110  1,148  1,083
observations
F-statistic  212.22***  735.64***  185.05***  381.37***  236.17***  87.68***
R-square  0.917  0.932  0.842  0.883  0.726  0.790
Notes'  OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors.  t-statistics
in parentheses.  ***  denotes significance at the 1 percent level;  ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level;
* denotes  significance at the  10 percent level.  The classification of product groups is based on Rauch (1999).
'Correct'  indicates a dummy variable as the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at least at the
10 percent level;  'insignificant'  indicates a dummy variable is not statistically different from zero; and
'wrong'  indicates a dummy variables has a wrong negative sign and is statistically significant  at least at the
10 percent level.
29Table 7:  Transport cost inclusive  gravity model,  1994
Dependent variable:  T,,  (1)  (2)
Distance  -0.645***  -0.678***
(-6.01)  (-7.64)
Tariff  + Transport  costs  -5.080***  -4.309***
(-9.51)  (-13.99)
Bilateral  calling  price of  exporter  -0.924***
(-3.10)
Bilateral  calling  price of importer  -0.543**
(-2.50)
Common border  Correct  Correct
Language  dummies
English  Correct  Correct
Spanish  Insignificant  Insignificant
Portuguese  Insignificant  Insignificant
Number of observations  4,932  10,798
F-statistic  45.94***  125.90***
R-square  0.337  0.386
Notes:  OLS regression with exporter  and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors.  t-statistics in
parentheses.  ***  denotes significance at the 1 percent level;  ** denotes significance  at the 5 percent level;  *
denotes significance  at the 10 percent level.  'Correct'  indicates a dummy variable  as the expected positive sign
and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level;  'insignificant'  indicates a dummy variable is not
statistically different from zero; and  'wrong'  indicates a dummy variables has a wrong negative sign and is
statistically significant at least at the 10  percent level.
30Table 8:  Gravity model using aggregate trade flows,  1999 (IV estimation)
Dependent variable:  T,j  (1)  (2)
Distance  -0.855***  -0.788***
(-13.69)  (-16.82)
Tariff  -3.037**  -2.428***
(-2.17)  (-2.58)
Bilateral  calling  price of exporter  -1.673**
(-2.20)
Bilateral  calling  price of importer  -2.806***
(-4.78)
Product of calling  prices to the US
Common border  Correct  Correct
Language dummies
English  Correct  Correct
Spanish  Insignificant  Correct
Portuguese  Insignificant  Insignificant
French  Insignificant  Correct
Arabic  Insignificant  Wrong
Number of  observations  1,187  1,063
F-statistic  17031.30***  1685.02***
R-square  0.899  0.924
Notes  Second stage instrumental variable regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White
robust standard errors.  t-statistics in parentheses.  ***  denotes significance  at the  I percent level; ** denotes
significance at the 5 percent  level; * denotes  significance at the  10 percent level.  'Correct'  indicates a dummy
variable as the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at least at the  10 percent level;
'insignificant'  indicates a dummy variable is not statistically different from zero; and 'wrong'  indicates a
dummy variables  has a wrong negative sign and is statistically significant at least at the  10 percent level.
Bilateral  calling price variables are fitted values from a first stage regression, using as instruments the products
of accounting rates and proxies for privatization and competition in the provision of international telephone
services (as explained in text).
31Data Annex
List of countries  included in the econometric analysis, using the 1999 trade data:
ALGERIA b  GUINEA b  PAPUA NEW GUINEA C
ANGOLA8a ' GUINEA-BISSAU8'  PARAGUAY b
ARGENTINA b  GUYANAat  PERUb
AUSTRALIA b  HAITI 
8 PHILIPPINES b
AUSTRIA b  HONDURAS  b  POLANDb
BANGLADESH'  HUNGARY'  PORTUGALb
BELGIUM  a C  ICELANDb  ROMANIA b
BENIN b  INDIA "  SENEGAL C
BOLIviA  b  INDONESIA b  SIERRA LEONE
BRAZIL b  IRAN,  ISLAMIC  REP. OF b  SINGAPORE b
BURKINA FASO  '  IRELAND b  SOUTH AFRICA b
BURUNDI a  ISRAEL C  SPAIN b
CAMEROONb  ITALYb  SRI LANKA b
CANADA"  JAMAICA'  SWEDENb
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.a c  JAPAN  b  SWIERLAND b
CHAD  a'  KENYA'  SYRIAN  ARAB REP."
CHILE C  KOREA b  TAIWAN, CHINA b
CHINA. HONG KONG b  LIBERIA a  TANZANIA b
CHINA. MAINLAND'  MADAGASCARb  THAILAND)'
COLOMBIA b  MALAWI '  TOGOb
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF  c  MALAYSIA b  TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
COSTA RICA '  MALI c  TUNISIA'
COTE D'IVOIRE b  MALTA  d  TURKEY b
DENMARKb  MAURITIUS b  UGANDA C
DOMINICAN REPUBLICat  MEXICO  b  UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  a c
ECUADOR b.C  MOROCCOb  UNITED KINGDOM b
EGYPT bC  MOZAMBIQUE  b  UNITED  STATES c
EL SALVADORc  MYANMAR '-  URUGUAYb
ETHIOPIA'  NEPAL  VENEZUELA'
FINLAND  b  NETHERLANDSb  VIETNAM  "c
FRANCE b  NEW ZEALAND b  YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF C
GABON 
"c  NICARAGUA b  ZAMBIA a
GAMBIA, THE  NiGER c  ZIMBABWE b
GERMANY"  NIGERIA b
GHANA'  NORWAYb
GREECE'  PAKISTAN b
GUATEMALAb  PANAMA b
Notes:
aExporter,  but not importer;
b Country reports data on bilateral telecom prices, and is reported as destination  for the same variable in reports by at
least one other country;
c Country does not report data on bilateral telecom prices, but is reported as destination for the same variable in
reports by at least one other country;
d Country reports data on bilateral telecom prices, but is not reported as degtination for the same variable  in reports
by other countries.
32Annex:  Robustness  tests
In this annex, we present additional econometric  estimates to assess how robust our findings are
to earlier years of estimation,  additional regressors,  and alternative model specifications.
First, in a one-sector setup, our model can be extended to yield the well-known gravity equation
with unit-elastic income terms.  The purpose of this exercise is to test the robustness of our
estimation equation (7) vis-a-vis an alternative  specification that is closer to the functional
constraints imposed by the CES preferences  in equation (1).27
Dropping the super/subscript k and normalizing each country's product price,  p,, at unity, we
can transform equation (4) to:
TV=  yw  I  (  4|,  (Al)
h  Yw  E48gtig
where  yW  denotes world GDP.28 Similar to the multi-sector models, we can account for country
specific variables by employing exporter and importer specific dummy variables. But we can
preserve the unit-elastic income terms by specifying our estimation equation in terms of the share
of bilateral trade in the product of the two trading partners'  GDPs:
Int KT  = A;+B, +(1-a)(l+tar,,q)+DlnDa  + X  lnC,, +E lnEa +c,  (A2)
27 Note that structural derivations of the gravity equations do not always predict a unit-elastic effect of the two
income terms.  See, for example, Anderson (1979) and Bergst-and (1985 and 1989).
28  See Deardorff(1998).  In equation (Al), bilateral trade depends on incomes and a complex term which captures
the trade inhibiting effect of bilateral trade costs.  Specifically,  the term in the square bracket says that if importing
countryj's relative trade cost with country i is greater than an average of all demander's relative trade costs with i,
then exports from i toj will be correspondingly smaller.  The trade inhibiting effect depends crucially on the
elasticity of substitution  a  . If a  = I  (the Cobb-Douglas  case), the term in the square bracket is equal to one and
exports will simply be reduced proportional to the trade cost factor to a level below the "frictionless"  benchmark.
33Table Al  shows the results of estimating equation (A2).29 The overall  fit of the regression is
poorer than in Table 3, with R-squares ranging from 0.45 to 0.73.  Nonetheless, it is remarkable
that the estimated coefficients  on the tariff variable, distance and the two "pure bilateral"  calling
prices remain largely unchanged.  By contrast, the coefficients  on the "constructed  bilateral"
telecom proxy is smaller in value.  The latter finding may be explained by the variable picking
up the effect of the excluded GDP terms in the regression with unconstrained  income elasticities.
Second, our estimations may suffer from a biased selection of samples, especially the regressions
with the bilateral calling price variables which only encompass between  1,000 and 1,200
observations.  We distinguish between two types of sample selection biases:  zero trade flows
(which are, by definition,  excluded in a log-linear model specification) and the availability of
data on our telecom proxy.  We employ a Heckman sample  selection model to correct for a
possible estimation bias in the basic OLS regression.  Specifically, we estimate two first-stage
probit equations-one for the existence of positive trade flows and one for the availability of
telecom data-and include two selectivity correction variables in the main regression.30 Our
explanatory variables in the probit equations are GDP, population and dummies for being a
landlocked or island economy of both the exporting and importing country as well as geographic
distance and dummy variables for sharing a common language.
Table A2 presents the second stage estimation results of the sample selection model.31 The
estimated coefficients are similar to the ones obtained in the simple OLS regression (Table 3).  A
notable exception is the coefficient on the product of calling prices to the US, which is much
smaller in size, but still significant at the 1 percent level.  None of the selectivity correction
parameters are statistically significant, except the parameter for non-zero trade flows in the
regression using the product of calling prices to the United States.  This result suggests a sample
selection bias in the larger sample estimates that use the product of US calling prices as the
telecom proxy.  Correcting  for this bias reduces the size of the coefficient on this proxy to a level
comparable to the other two calling price proxies.
29  Countries' GDPs were taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
30 In doing so, we assume that the error terms in the two probit regressions  are uncorrelated.
31  The first stage probit regressions overwhelmingly  show the expected  signs and are mostly statistically significant.
34We 'also estimated a sample selection model for the sectoral  gravity models using the Rauch
classification of products.  The second stage estimation results are presented in  Table A3.  The
coefficients  on the tariff variable are similar to the simple OLS regressions (Table 6).  In the case
of differentiated goods the point estimate is now close to zero for both samples, suggesting a
substitution elasticity of close to unity.  The coefficients  on distance are somewhat lower
compared to the simple OLS regression (Table 6), whereas the telecom coefficients remain
largely unchanged.  The conclusions regarding the relative importance of communications costs
across the three Rauch product groups remain unchanged.  In particular, we observe a
'downward trend'  in the coefficient on the importer's calling price as we move from
differentiated  to homogenous products, whereas the estimated substitution elasticity shows a
'reverse'  upward trend.  Moreover, the exporter's  calling price does not have a statistically
significant impact for products traded over organized exchanges.  Only three out of twelve
sample correction parameters are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and two more
parameters are significant at the  10 percent level.  Overall, these findings suggest that potential
biases from a non-random selection of samples are likely to be small.
Finally, we tested how robust our findings concerning trade in differentiated versus homogenous
products are to the product classification used.  Rauch (1999) provides an alternative  "more
liberal" classification,  which maximizes the number of commodities that are classified as either
organized exchange or reference  priced.  The OLS estimation results using the "more liberal"
classification  (not presented here)  were very similar to the ones presented in Table 6 and
confirme,d all the findings discussed in the text.
35Table Al:  Gravity model using aggregate trade flows
(unit-elastic income  elasticities),  1999
Dependent variable:  T,/I(YY)  (1)  (2)  (3)
Distance  -0.665***  -0.575***  -1.065***
(-9.57)  (-9.79)  (-23.38)
Tariff  -2.454*  -2.331***  -2.836***
(-1.97)  (-2.48)  (-3.45)
Bilateral  calling  price of exporter  -0.846***
(-5.47)
Bilateral  calling  price of importer  -0.774***
(-5.28)
Product  of calling  prices to the US  -0.572***
(-5.77)
Common border  Insignificant  Correct  Correct
Language dummies
English  Correct  Correct  Correct
Spanish  Insignificant  Insignificant  Correct
Portuguese  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant
French  Insignificant  Correct  Correct
Arabic  Insignificant  Insignificant  Correct
Number of  observations  1,209  1,083  4,079
F-statistic  239.54***  1048.42***  25.27***
R-square  0.731  0.719  0.451
Notes:  OLS regression with exporter and inporter fixed effects and White robust standard errors.  t-
statistics in parentheses.  ***  denotes significance  at the 1  percent level; ** denotes  significance at the 5
percent level;  * denotes significance at the  10 percent level.
36Table A2:  Sample selection  model  using aggregate trade flows,  1999
Dependent variable:  T,,  (1)  (2)  (3)
Distance  -0.415***  -0.507***  -0.990***
(-3.13)  (-3.93)  (-14.32)
Tariff  -2.529***  -2.319***  -2.634***
(-2.06)  (-2.46)  (-3.26)
Bilateral  calling  price of  exporter  -0.870***
(-5.50)
Bilateral  calling  price  of importer  -0.748***
(-5.07)
Product of  calling  prices to the US  -0.785***
(-8.86)
Common Border  Correct  Correct  Correct
Language Dummies
English  Correct  Correct  Insignificant
Spanish  Insignificant  Insignificant  Correct
Portuguese  Insignificant  Insignificant  Correct
French  Insignificant  Correct  Correct
Arabic  Insignificant  Insignificant  Correct
Selectivity correction (positive  -1.365  0.862  -2.586***
trade)  (-1.49)  (1.18)  (-7.14)
Selectivity correction (telecom data)  -0.407  -0.199  -0.012
(-1.57)  (-0.81)  (-0.01)
Number of observations  1,209  1,083  4,079
(10,710)  (10,710)  (10,710)
F-statistic  976.34***  614.83***  144.44***
R-square  0.907  0.929  0.814
Notes:  Second stage OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard
errors.  t-statistics in parentheses.  ***  denotes significance  at the I percent level; ** denotes  significance at
the 5 percent level; * denotes  significance at the 10 percent level.  The number of observations  in the
brackets  indicate the number of observations used in the two probit equations.
37Table A3:  Trade in differentiated versus homogenous  goods
(sample  selection  model),  1999
Products traded
Differentiated  Reference priced  over organized
products  products  exchanges
Dependent
variable: T,  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Distance  -0.331***  -0.428***  -0.549***  -0.878***  -0.714***  -0.798***
(-2.47)  (-3.24)  (-2.90)  (-4.76)  (-3.38)  (-3.94)
Tarif  0.090  0.152  -0.563  -1.940***  -3.767*  -3.150***
(0.09)  (0.16)  (-0.49)  (-2.62)  (-1.88)  (-3.37)
Bilateral  calling  -0.614***  -0.733***  -0.268
price of exporter  (-3.88)  (-3.62)  (-0.98)
Bilateral  calling  -0.940***  -0.756***  -0.720***
price of importer  (-6.37)  (-3.00)  (-3.08)
Common border  Correct  Correct  Correct  Insignificant  Correct  Correct
Language dummies
English  Correct  Insignificant  Correct  Correct  Insignificant  Insignificant
Spanish  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant
Portuguese  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Correct  Insignificant  Insignificant
French  Insignificant  Correct  Insignificant  Correct  Insignificant  Insignificant
Arabic  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Insignificant  Wrong
Selectivity  -0.060  -5.394***  -0.914  -7.841***  7.338  -1.025
correction (positive  (-0.02)  (-2.88)  (-0.26)  (-3.00)  (1.50)  (-0.27)
trade)
Selectivity  -0.769***  -0.056  -0.716*  0.425  -0.909*  -0.719
correction (telecom  (-2.80)  (-0.21)  (-1.89)  (1.33)  (-1.89)  (-1.62)
data)
Number of  1,202  1,084  1,176  1,077  1,131  1,050
observations  (8,055)  (8,055)  (6,981)  (6,981)  (5,844)  (5,844)
F-statistic  228.29***  247.24***  194.34***  1743.83***  234.34***  89.53***
R-square  0.921  0.935  0.844  0.888  0.731  0.796
Notes:  Second stage OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects  and White robust standard errors.
t-statistics in parentheses.  ***  denotes significance  at the I percent level; ** denotes  significance at the 5
percent level;  * denotes significance at the  10 percent level.  The classification of product groups is based on
Rauch (1999).
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